(p -Cymene)thioglycollatoruthenium(II) dimer; a complex with an ambi-basic S,O-donor ligand

The title compound was prepared from the (p-cymene)ruthenium chloride dimer and thioglycollic acid. The structure is a centrosymmetric dimer bridged by the soft-base S atoms, with the hard-base O atoms of the carboxylate group chelating to form a five-membered twisted-ring. The coordination of the ruthenium atoms is completed by a η6-p-cymene ligand, giving an 18-electron count. The Ru–S bonds are essentially equal at 2.396(1) Å

The Globalization of the Legal Profession

Globalization of The Legal Profession, Symposium. Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, April 6, 200

An Empirical Study of Single-Tier versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200

During the last decade, many of the nation\u27s largest law firms have converted from single-tier to two-tier (or multi-tier) partnerships. A two-tier firm contains separate tracks for equity and nonequity partner. The equity tier typically controls the firm and enjoys a larger per capita share of the firm\u27s profits. At present, two-tier partnerships make up 80 percent of Am Law 200. The conventional explanation for the growth of the two-tier system (or, conversely, the abandonment of the single-tier) is that it produces higher profits per equity partner (PPP), thus solidifying the prestige of the firm and improving its ability to attract the best legal talent. Drawing upon a comprehensive dataset of Am Law 200 firms, this study documents that average PPP is significantly higher in single-tier firms, even after controlling for geographic market segment and firm leverage. The higher profitability of single-tier firms appears to be a function of higher levels of reputational capital, which enable single-tier firms to (a) attract and retain a more lucrative client base, and (b) run a more rigorous promotion-to-partnership tournament. Based upon a ten-year longitudinal sample, this study also found negligible statistical evidence that the two-tier structure, after controlling for relative starting position and geographic market, is associated with larger gains in PPP. In light of its uncertain financial benefits, the author theorizes that the two-tier structure is primarily a bonding mechanism used by less prestigious firms to institutionalize a marginal product method of partnership compensation and consolidate managerial control for the benefit of the firm\u27s most powerful partners. Failure to switch to the two-tier structure leaves the firm vulnerable to defections and possible collapse. As a result, the primary economic benefit of the two-tier format may be firm stability rather than higher average PPP. Finally, this study provides some evidence that the appeal of permanent nonequity partnership status, which typically entails fewer professional demands, may set in a motion an adverse selection problem at the associate recruitment level, thus undermining some of the perceived benefits of a two-tier (or multi-tier) format

Innovation Diffusion in the Legal Industry

This article is adapted from a series of blog posts originally found in my recently-started blog entitled Legal Evolution. The foundational material set forth in this article (and in those blog posts) applies to the legal services market insights gained from disciplines other than law. This article begins by setting forth the well-established theory of an innovation diffusion curve and the research that has identified the factors that affect the rate of adoption of innovations. This article identifies why innovation in the legal services market is desirable and applies to the legal services field insights drawn from this research in other fields. In the course of presenting these theories, the article explains why and how research about things such as the speed of adoption of hybrid corn seed is directly relevant to lawyers and law firms. It also identifies factors that can promote innovation within a law firm and factors that can inhibit innovation within a law firm, including the challenges that firms face because factors that promote the initial stage of innovation may later hamper its widespread implementation. In addition to the discussion of the applicability of the innovation diffusion curve to the legal services market, this article discusses the relevance of work that has been done outside of law to identify when an innovation is likely to cross the chasm between early adopters and an early majority and the relevance of Gartner\u27s work about the impact and stages of hype. This article also explains the crucial role that communication channels, such as the Legal Evolution blog, can play in fostering innovation within the legal services market and explains how the foundational understanding set forth in this article can help promote legal services innovation and can help one understand the reasons for the successes-and failures-of legal services innovation. Although the content of this article originally was published in the foundational posts of the Legal Evolution blog, publication of this article means that my presentation of research from other fields and the conclusions I draw from that research can reach those who prefer a more traditional method of transmission. I thank the editors of Penn State\u27s Dickinson Law Review for recognizing the importance of these issues and for agreeing to publish this article which does not fit the traditional heavily-footnoted law review format

A Blueprint for Change

This Article discusses the financial viability of law schools in the face of massive structural changes now occurring within the legal industry. It then offers a blueprint for change - a realistic way for law schools to retool themselves in an attempt to provide our students with high quality professional employment in a rapidly changing world. Because no institution can instantaneously reinvent itself, a key element of Professor Henderson\u27s proposal is the 12% solution: approximately 12% of faculty members take the lead on building a competency-based curriculum that is designed to accelerate the development of valuable skills and behaviors prized by both legal and nonlegal employers. For a variety of practical reasons, successful implementation of the blueprint requires law schools to band together in consortia. The goal of these initiatives needs to be the creation and implementation of a world-class professional education in which our graduates consistently and measurably outperform graduates from traditional J.D. programs

The LSAT, Law School Exams and Meritocracy: The Surprising and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed

Within the field of psychometrics, it is widely acknowledged that test-taking speed and reasoning ability are separate abilities with little or no correlation to each other. The LSAT is a univariate test designed to measure reasoning ability; test-taking speed is assumed to be an ancillary variable with a negligible effect on candidate scores. This Article explores the possibility that test-taking speed is variable common to both the LSAT and actual law school exams. This commonality is important because it may serve to increase the predictive validity of the LSAT. The author obtained data from a national and a regional law school and followed the methodology of a typical LSAT validity study, with one important exception: student performance was disaggregated into three distinct testing methods with varying degrees of time pressure: (1) in-class exams, (2) take-home exams, and (3) papers. Consistent with the hypothesis, the data showed that the LSAT was a relatively robust predictor of in-class exams and a relatively weak predictor on take-home exams and papers. In contrast, undergraduate GPA was a relatively stable predictor on all three testing methods. The major implication of this study is that the current emphasis on time-pressured law school exams increases the relative importance of the LSAT as an admission criterion. Further, because the performance gap between white and minority students tends to be larger on the LSAT than UGPA (the other important numerical admissions criteria), heavy reliance on time-pressured law school exams is likely to have the indirect effect of making it more difficult for minority students to be admitted through the regular admissions process. The findings of this study also suggest that when speed is used as a variable on law school exams, the type of testing method, independent of knowledge and preparation, can change the ordering (i.e., relative grades) of individual test-takers. The current emphasis on time-pressured exams, therefore, may skew measures of merit in ways that have little theoretical relationship to the actual practice of law. Finally, this study found some preliminary evidence that the performance gap between white and minority students may be smaller on less time-pressured testing methods, including blindgraded take-home exams. Definitive evidence on this issue will require a larger sample size